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Editorial on the Research Topic
Is the Language Faculty Nonlinguistic?
A line of research in cognitive science over several decades has been dedicated to mapping a
hypothetically innate, language-specific cognitive system, a faculty that allows human infants to
acquire languages natively without formal instruction and within short periods of time. In recent
years, this search has attracted significant controversy in cognitive science generally, and in the
language sciences specifically. Some maintain that the search has had meaningful results, though
there are different views as to what the findings are: ranging from the view that there is a rich
and rather specific set of principles, to the idea that the contents of the language faculty are—
while specifiable—in fact extremely minimal. Other researchers rigorously oppose the continuation
of this search, arguing that decades of effort have turned up nothing. The fact remains that the
proposal of a language-specific faculty was made for a good reason, namely as an attempt to solve
the vexing puzzle of language in our species. Much work has been developing to address this, and
specifically, to look for ways to characterize the language faculty as an emergent phenomenon;
i.e., not as a dedicated, language-specific system, but as the emergent outcome of a set of uniquely
human but not specifically linguistic factors, in combination. A number of theoretical and empirical
approaches are being developed in order to account for the great puzzles of language—language
processing, language usage, language acquisition, the nature of grammar, and language change
and diversification. The goal of this Research Topic is to ask whether a paradigm shift has indeed
occurred that allows us to conceptualize language not as an innate, dedicated faculty, but as the
result of general cognitive abilities adapted for linguistic use.
In the first of three review articles, Da˛browska reviews the fundamental arguments in support of
the Universal Grammar hypothesis. The focus is on the three most powerful arguments, namely
universality, convergence, and poverty of stimulus. The author maintains that all three can be
proven wrong: languages have been shown to display deep differences of structure; significant
variation has been documented in speakers’ knowledge of grammar; and grammatical constructions
have been proven to be learnable through input. The second review by Christiansen and Chater
takes issue with the latest, most minimal proposal for a language faculty (LF): recursion. Through
a review and discussion of genetic, non-human primate and neuro-scientific research the authors
argue that an innate LF is evolutionarily unlikely. The ability to process recursive structure emerges
gradually through adaptation of domain-general sequence learning abilities. The relationship
between domain-specificity and linguistic adaptation is the focus of the third review, by Culbertson
and Kirby. The authors propose that our linguistic knowledge is best seen as a unique interaction
of domain-general capacities with language. This can be illustrated by what they see as a powerful
general bias towards simplicity of representation, whichmanifests itself cross-linguistically through
universal tendencies such as compositionality, regularity, harmony, and isomorphism.
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In their more theoretical article, Mattos and Hinzen shift the
focus of the debate to the acquisition of declarative gestures
in pre-verbal children. Even before the onset of one-word
expressions, children show the ability to link lexical concepts
to gestures. This, the authors argue, can only be explained by
a system that is both symbolic and referential, and must be
taken as a challenge to the alleged non-linguistic roots of natural
pedagogy. In the second article of more theoretical nature, Adger
and Svenonius defend the view that “aspects of our best theories
of syntactic phenomena are simply special cases of more general
principles. But those more general principles are not established
at the moment [. . . ] generative syntax provides a potential
way to reach those more general principles.” A methodological
point made here is that in evaluating domain specificity we
need to ensure that we evaluate principles of actual explanatory
power. A theoretical point maintains that principles might exist
that are language-specialized, i.e., linguistic versions of more
general cognitive principles. The third of these more theoretically
oriented contributions, by Goldberg, concerns exactly what kind
of evidence should be used in support of UG. Goldberg looks
at the “subtle and intricate” implicit knowledge of language that
speakers seem to possess. Even these cases, the author argues,
do not warrant the positing of unlearned syntactic structures,
as they can be explained by the functions of the constructions
involved. Crucially these are learned, conventionalized, and only
require domain-general constraints on perception, attention and
memory.
Two original research papers offer strong views against
innateness. Archangeli and Pulleyblank present a take on
phonology based on the Emergent Grammar Hypothesis. In
this view humans are understood to make sense of linguistic
data primarily through three non-linguistic abilities: categorial
thinking, sensitivity to frequency, and symbolic generalization. In
three case studies ranging from English to Bantu and Esimbi, the
authors show how diverse language data can be explained by such
operational abilities. They propose an emergent basis for not only
phonology but possiblymorphological structures too. In a second
original research paper, Evans approaches human language as a
communicative system that must have two fundamental design
features: a conceptual and a linguistic system, each of which
contributes to meaning construction. Evans argues that both
systems operate in a symbiotic relation and are semantic in
nature, but the former is evolutionarily older and is the one to
which the latter is adapted.
Finally, in a perspective piece, Everett takes issue in
particular with the notion of a “phonological mind,”
or phonological nativism. The proposal, according to
the author, suffers from at least two shortcomings. A
theoretical problem is that properties invoked in phonological
nativism are not successfully explained in evolutionary
terms. A methodological problem confuses design features
of any given system with innate, rather than acquired,
constraints.
We are pleased to present a set of articles that approach our
research question—Is the language faculty nonlinguistic?—from
a range of angles, and with consideration of multiple stances on
the question. Perhaps most importantly, this applies to the very
idea of what a language faculty is. The concept can be understood
in two distinct ways:
(1) That which humans have which is biologically necessary to
learn language.
(2) That which humans have which is biologically necessary to
learn language and which is not a general purpose learning
mechanism.
We might call (1) an axiom. Nobody hypothesizes that humans
have a capacity for language. Rather, that capacity is the thing to
be explained and understood. By contrast, (2) is a hypothesis, i.e.,
that the relevant mechanisms are not general but are specifically
dedicated to language. These two concepts of a language faculty
must not be confused. Progress with this central problem in
the psychology of language will not only require a constructive
approach to dialogue between those of differing views, it will
require conceptual clarity at every step.
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